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LABOR STRIFE IN THE NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, WHY THE REGGIE
WHITE SETTLEMENT WAS
UNFAIRLY SETTLED FOR THOSE
INVOLVED AND WHY THIS SETTLEMENT
WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO MORE
PROBLEMS
STEVEN WAYNE HAYS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The game of Football has its roots in rugby, which began
around 1840 in England.' Rugby's transformation to football
occurred in the United States in the 1870's with a few games
between colleges. 2 The new sport caught on, and in 1920 the first
major professional league was formed in Canton, Ohio. Known as
the American Professional Football Association, this new league
consisted of a number of formerly industrial or semi-professional
football teams.3 Among these original franchises were the Akron
Pros, the Canton Bulldogs, the Massillon Tigers, the Hammond
Pros, the Muncie Flyers, the Racine Cardinals, the Rock Island
Independents, the Decatur Staleys, and the Rochester Jeffersons.4
The following year the league changed its name to the National
Football League (NFL). By 1926, the league had grown to
twenty-two teams.6 By 1931, it was down to ten.7 In fact, 1936
was the first year since the League's founding that did not include
a franchise shift of some sort- and also was the first season in
which all teams played the same number of games.8 From these
* B.S., The University of Michigan, 1988; J.D., Loyola University, New Orleans,
1995. I would like to thank J. Douglas Sunseri of Nicaud & Sunseri for his help in
researching this article. I would also like to thank Edmund P. Edmonds, Dean of
Library Services, Loyola University, New Orleans, for his help in writing this article.
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humble beginnings, it is hard to imagine how over the next seventy-five years the NFL managed to achieve such enormous success in attracting an audience to watch and participate in the
game of football.
Unfortunately, growth brings about other problems. Thus, a
predictable result of the success of the NFL was the advent of
labor disputes between management and the players. An underlying current throughout its history has been the success of the
National Football League Establishment in retaining substantial
power over its players. The same cannot be said about the
National Football League Players Association(NFLPA). The
NFLPA has a history of agreeing to implement measures which
have had a negative impact on the very players it represents.
This paper attempts to show, from a player's perspective, how
the labor disputes and alleged measures to remedy the anticompetitive effects have failed to give the players what they want and
probably deserve: the right to shop their services in an open market. Two players, Maurice Hurst, of the New England Patriots,
and John Fourcade 9 , formerly of the New Orleans Saints, symbolize the frustration that players have felt throughout the course of
these labor problems. Specifically, the anticompetitive effects of
the implementation of "Plan B" in 1989 and subsequent settlement of all Plan B claims in the White v. National Football
League' ° decision combine to demonstrate how Hurst and Fourcade were denied a fair and reasonable settlement of their particular complaints against the National Football League by being
made a part of a class action in which they had no control.
This paper will tell the story of Maurice Hurst, John Fourcade, and the many players who were aggrieved by the implementation of Plan B. Part II will describe the events leading up to the
implementation of Plan B, then describe the particulars of Plan B
itself, and lawsuits which followed. Part III will show how far
reaching the White decision was, what impact it has had on potential litigation based on the settlement, and how it has had a direct
impact on the new collective bargaining agreement reached
between the National Football League and the NFLPA in 1994.
9. Due to the recentness of the United States Supreme Court decision to refuse
to hear the claims to nullify the $195 million settlement of the White case, certain
documents could not be cited in normal law review form. However, each source may
be confirmed by J. Douglas Sunseri, attorney for Maurice Hurst. These are footnote
numbers 43-51, 63, 76, 86, 87, 106, 119-130, 135, 136, 155-58, 165-71, 173, and 174.
10. 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994).
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II.

LABOR STRIFE IN THE NFL

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE ANTICOMPETITWVE EFFECTS
IN THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

A

Free Agency, the "Rozelle Rule," and Right of First
Refusal / Compensation System

Before 1976 professional football had the same kind of reserve
system as other sports. 1 ' To enter the NFL, players were drafted
by single teams. 12 Then, the players signed standard contracts
that bound them to their teams for their careers. 13 The only significant player movement was accomplished through trades, waivers, or by being sold.' 4 Players were not free to initiate movement
on their own, and as such, were in a weak bargaining position
with team owners.15
The first important legal case challenging the owners' control
over players was Radovich v. National Football League.'" William
Radovich, an all-pro guard formerly with the Detroit Lions, contended that the NFL entered into a conspiracy to monopolize and
control organized professional football in the United States, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 17 He claimed that
part of the conspiracy was to destroy the All-America Conference,
a competitive league in which he once played.' 8 Radovich also
alleged that the NFL had conspired to prevent him from coaching
the San Francisco Clippers of the Pacific Coast League, an NFL
affiliate, by threatening the club with serious penalties if they
signed him in any position.' 9 He claimed that the NFL's illegal
in the sum of $35,000, to be trebled as proconduct damaged him
0
2
vided by the Act.

Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision, did not award damages to Radovich, but did establish that the antitrust laws of the
Sherman Act apply to professional football. The Court's reasoning
was based on the relatively high volume of interstate commerce
involved in the sport. 21 The Court further noted that seemingly
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

STAUDOHAR, supra note 1 at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id,
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contrary cases such as Federal Baseball 22 and Toolson 23 did not
control, as they were limited to the business of professional
baseball.'
The Radovich decision stuck a major blow to the NFL. The
dust had barely settled five years later when a player named R.C.
Owens' came along to rub salt in the wounds. In 1962, Owens was
able to play out his option with the San Francisco Forty-Niners
and then sign with the Baltimore Colts without compensation to
the former team. The NFL responded with the infamous "Rozelle
Rule," adopted the following year.25
Coined after then-Commissioner of the NFL Pete Rozelle, the
Rozelle Rule was an amendment to the organization's Constitution and By-Laws. It essentially provided that a team desiring the
services of a veteran player whose contract had expired could not
sign that player without providing some form of compensation to
the player's former club.26 If the clubs could not agree on the
compensation, the Commissioner would assess the compensation
27
after the fact.

The Rozelle Rule restricted players' freedom of movement and
denied them the right to sell their services in a free and open market.28 Most clubs felt it was too risky to sign new players because
it was uncertain what penalty would be imposed by the Commis-

22. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (holding baseball to
be primarily a local activity and therefore exempt from federal antitrust law).
23. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). The Toolson case is
one of the more interesting Supreme Court decisions. The Court was asked to review
whether or not baseball should be forced to conform to federal antitrust law since it
had expanded to meet well more than the established criteria for interstate activities.
The Court reasoned that while under the letter of the law it is true that baseball
should be forced to comply with these pre-existing federal statutes, the baseball
industry had been operating for over thirty years in reliance on Federal Baseball's
permanence. The Court further noted that Congress had tacitly assented to Federal
Baseball by failing to pass any new laws attempting to pull baseball within the grasp
of these antitrust statutes. Therefore, the Court held that more harm would be done
to society in overruling Federal Baseball than in allowing this 'dubious' decision to
stand. However, the Court's opinion makes it clear that its decision applies only to
baseball, due to the aforementioned unique circumstances. See also Radovich, 352
U.S. at 450.
24. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450.
25. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 611.
28. STAUDOHAR supra, note 1, at 78.
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sioner.29 The effect of the Rozelle Rule was to substantially
restrain competition among NFL teams for players' services.3 0
In the 1972 case Mackey v. National Football League, 31 several players brought action challenging the legality of the Rozelle
Rule under antitrust law.32 The district court in Minnesota found
the Rozelle Rule to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws as
well as invalid under the 'rule of reason' standard. 33 The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed on the basis of the rule
of reason standard, holding the Rozelle Rule constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
34
Act.

The court noted that the availability of the nonstatutory labor
exemption for a particular agreement turns upon whether the relevant federal labor policy is deserving of preeminence over federal
antitrust policy under the circumstances of the particular case.3 "
The court further noted that certain principles can be deduced
from those decisions governing the proper accommodations of the
competing labor and antitrust interests involved. 36 According to
the court:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may
potentially be given preeminence over the antitrust laws
where the restraint of trade primarily effects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship... 1 Second,

federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only
where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining.. .s Finally, the
policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the
degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where
the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona
fide arm's-length bargaining..."
29. For example, the New Orleans Saints' signing of all-pro receiver David Parks

of the San Francisco Forty-Niners cost the Saints their first-round draft choices in
1968 and 1969. Id.
30. For instance, from 1963 to 1976, only four players (Pat Fischer, David Parks,
Phil Olson, and Dick Gordon) actually played out their options and signed with new
teams.
31. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975).
32. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 606.
33. Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975).
34. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 606.

35. Id. at 613.
36. Id. at 614.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Applying the principles to the facts in Mackey, the Court of
Appeals found that the first two tests were met. 40 The alleged
restraint of trade affected only the parties to the agreement and,
further, the Rozelle Rule constituted a mandatory bargaining subject within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.4 1
However, the Court of Appeals found substantial evidence to support the finding that there was no bona fide arm's-length bargaining over the Rozelle Rule preceding the execution of the 1968 and
1970 agreements. 42 As such, the court concluded that the agreements between the clubs and the players embodying the Rozelle
Rule did not qualify for the labor exemption and were not exempt
from the coverage of the antitrust laws.43
Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings of the district
court, with the exception of their finding of a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, including a determination of
the damages.4 A subsequent class action by the players for damages was settled with the payment of $13,675,000 to the NFL
defendants.4 5 This marked the first successful challenge to the
Rozelle Rule under antitrust law.
It was not always so easy for players to gain a remedy for the
NFL's's illegal conduct. One challenge to the Rozelle Rule was
made by Joe Kapp, who alleged, inter alia, that the NFL violations
of antitrust laws caused his unlawful expulsion from professional
football in 1971.46 The Ninth Circuit held that the mere fact that
some of the rules of the NFL were violative of antitrust law did not
automatically produce damages for Kapp; Kapp had to prove he
47
was injured by reason of one of these unlawful practices.
Because the court held that Kapp did not prove damages under
the Clayton Act, it did not decide whether the lower court was correct in its holding that the challenged rules violated antitrust
laws.48
40. Id. at 615.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 616.
43. Id. at 622.
44. Id.
45. See Hurst v. National Football League Complaint at 11.
46. Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F.2d 644, 645 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). In addition to the Rozelle Rule, Kapp attacked the draft
rule, the tampering rule, the option rule, and the rule stating that each player must
sign a standard player contract.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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Not only did Kapp fail in his attempts to gain compensation
from the NFL, but his case provided a light at the end of the tunnel for the NFL. The lower court made it clear that the Rule
would have had to been formed as part of a labor negotiation in
order to qualify for what is known as a 'labor exemption' to antitrust law.4 9 The NFL was quick to react. In 1977 they entered
into collective bargaining agreements with the NFLPA.5 0 A new
set of restraints, called the "First Refusal/Compensation" system,
was formed.
This new system enabled each NFL team to prohibit a veteran free agent from moving to a competing team by matching
that competing team's offer to the player.5 1 Moreover, if the
player's former team refused to match the offer, it was to receive
substantial compensation from the signing team in the form of one
or more college draft choices. 2 Most importantly, the NFL succeeded in gaining the limited "labor exemption" it sought from the
antitrust laws, since the new rule was the result of these collectively bargained-for agreements.5 3
This First Refusal/Compensation system was substantially
modified and incorporated into a successor agreement executed in
1982. 54 This new system proved to be even more restrictive to
competition for services than the Rozelle Rule. In fact, only one of
the over 1,400 players whose contract expired during the length of
the 1977 and 1982 agreements ever received an offer from a competing team, and that offer was matched so the player was not
permitted to switch teams. 5 5
After the 1982 Agreement expired in August of 1987, the
National Football League maintained the status quo on all
mandatory subjects covered by the agreement, including the First
Refusal/Compensation system. 56 In September of 1987, the players initiated a strike over veteran free agency and other issues.
However, this strike proved unsuccessful.5 7 Faced with the NFL's
continued imposition of the First Refusal/Compensation system,
on October 15, 1987, the NFLPA, along with several individual
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 645.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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players, filed a class action suit in district court in Minnesota. 8
The complaint alleged that the continued imposition of the First
Refusal/Compensation system, without the union's consent, constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of antitrust laws. The district court found that the nonstatutory labor
exemption only survived until such time as the parties had
reached an impasse in their bargaining with respect to that
issue.5 9 On June 17, 1988, the district court ruled that impasse
had in fact been reached as to the First Refusal/Compensation
system, and, therefore, the system was subject to the antitrust
laws.6 0 Subsequently, on January 6, 1989, Judge Doty ruled that
the labor exemption protected the NFL team owners from antitrust liability with respect to the college draft until expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement which included the draft
provision. 6 '
These victories by the players were short lived, however, as
the Eighth Circuit soon held that the antitrust laws under the circumstances of this case are inapplicable, because the nonstatutory
labor exemption extends beyond impasse.6 2 In so doing, the
Eighth Circuit noted that "National labor policy sometimes override antitrust policy and this case presented just such an occasion." 63 The Eighth Circuit stated that the parties had several
choices to consider, including further bargaining, resorting to economic force, or to present claims to the National Labor Relations
Board. 4
After Powell IV and the continued inability to obtain a new
collectively bargaining agreement, the NFLPA, on November 6,
1989, notified the NFL of its decision to decertify as collective bargaining representative for the players, effective December 5,
1989.65 On December 5, 1989, the NFLPA's player representatives unanimously adopted new bylaws that ended the organiza58. Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988)(Powell

I).
59. Id. at 789.
60. Powell v. National Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Minm. 1988)
(Powell H1).
61. Powell v. National Football League, 711 F. Supp. 959 (D. Minn. 1989)
(Powell III).
62. Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir.
1989)(Powell IV).
63. Id. at 1303.
64. Id at 1303.
65. Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp 1351, 1356 (D. Minn. 1991)
(Powell V).
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tion's status as a collective bargaining representative.6 6 The
decertification was needed, the Players Association felt, in order to
allow players' antitrust suits to go forward. 7 This strategy
worked, to a certain extent, as Judge Doty subsequently ruled
that an ongoing collective bargaining agreement had ceased, foreclosing reliance on the labor exemption defense.6 8 However,
because there was no bargaining representative to deal with, the
NFL unilaterally changed insurance benefits and lengthened the
season without notifying the association.6 9
B.

The Implementation of Developmental Squads
and "PlanB"

After the 1987 collective bargaining agreement expired, the
NFL and the NFLPA began negotiations on a new agreement. °
In 1989, with the two sides making little progress towards an
agreement, the owners unilaterally adopted two important measures, Resolution G-2 and "Plan B."7 1
The first, called Resolution G-2, allowed each club to maintain
a developmental squad of as many as six rookie or "first-year"
practice and replacement players in addition to its usual 47-player
squad.7 2 In addition, a salary of $1000 per week was proposed.73
Despite rejection of the fixed salary component of the Developmental Squad proposal by Gene Upshaw, NFLPA Executive
Director, Resolution G-2 along with the salary scale were unilaterally implemented.7 4
On May 9, 1990, Antony Brown and eight other Developmental Squad players filed a class action antitrust lawsuit against the
clubs and the NFL, alleging that the fixed salary constituted an
75
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held
that the NFL's agreement on a fixed salary violated the Sherman
66. Id.
67. The players relied on Judge Heaney's dissent in Powell v. National Football
League, 888 F.2d 559, 570 (8th Cir. 1990), which stated that "once a union agrees to a
package of player restraints, it will be bound to the package forever unless the union
forfeits its bargaining rights."
68. Powell V, 764 F. Supp. at 1351.
69. See Hurst Complaint to U.S. District Court at 15.
70. Brown v. National Football League, 1995 WL 115729 *1, *2 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *3.
74. Id.
75. Id.
Published by Institutional Repository, 1996
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Act, and, after a trial to determine damages, entered a judgment
in the amount of $30,349,642, and enjoined the NFL from ever
setting a uniform salary for any class of players. 76 However, the
D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the NFL was shielded from liability due to the nonstatutory labor exemption. 77 As such, the
NFL acted lawfully within the framework of the collective bargaining process when it unilaterally imposed a fixed salary for
practice squad players. 7v The Court further noted that:
Although there has been much debate over the years regarding the scope of the exemption, at least one principle seems
clear: restraints on competition lawfully imposed through
the collective bargaining process are exempted from antitrust liability so long as such restraints primarily affect only
the labor market organized around the collective bargaining
arrangement. Thus, employees confronted with actions
imposed lawfully through the collective bargaining process
must respond not with a lawsuit brought under the Sherman
Act, but rather with weapons provided by the federal labor
laws.7 9
Thus, the Court reasoned that "the NFL was free to take unilateral action after impasse (just as the NFLPA was free to strike),
because the action was a legitimate economic weapon available to
be used in an attempt to force a settlement."8 0
"Plan B," on the other hand, was a measure directed against
veteran players in the NFL. Under one provision of "Plan B," the
NFL proposed to eliminate all individual contract negotiations
with players as of February 1, 1993, and to establish a wage scale
setting the price for all NFL players' services. 81 Another provision
allowed each NFL team to "protect" 37 out of 44 active roster players who were subject to the First Refusal/Compensation system,
leaving only the few remaining active roster players and other
"injured reserve" or non-active roster players on each team with a
limited two month period of free agency. 2
After the imposition of "Plan B," eight individual plaintiffs,
led by Freeman McNeil, whose contracts expired on February 1,
1990, asserting various claims arising from the NFL's alleged vio76. Id. at *1.

77. Id. at *2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 872, 876 (D. Minn. 1992).
82. See Hurst Complaint at 15.
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol13/iss2/2
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lation of §1 of the Sherman Act.83 On April 15, 1992, the United
States District Court in Minnesota, Judge Doty presiding, held
that (1) league and member clubs were capable of conspiring for
purposes of federal antitrust law; (2) antitrust laws applied
restraints operating solely within the labor market; (3) the rule
striking labor exemption defense raised by team and owners as
result of termination of collective bargaining relationship between
players association could be applied retroactively; and (4) league
and owners were not collaterally estopped from re-litigating existence of monopoly power by league and owners in the relevant market for services of major league professional football player
services in the United States.84 After this ruling, a jury trial was
held to determine the amount of damages suffered by each of the
litigants. On September 10, 1992, the jury awarded $543,000 in
actual damages before trebling, distributed to the named plaintiffs
as follows:8 5
$178,000
1. Mark Collins
0
2. Don Majkowski
0
3. Tim McDonald
0
4. Freeman McNeil
50,000
5. Frank Minnifield
240,000
6. Dave Richards
0
7. Niko Noga
75,000
8. Lee Rouson
Four days after McNeil was decided, another class action was
brought by ten plaintiffs whose contracts expired as of February 1,
1992.86 Perhaps due to the fact that the McNeil plaintiffs received
such a small settlement on their claims, the Jackson plaintiffs,
whose contracts expired as of February 1, 1992, sought only a temporary restraining order and injunction to prohibit the NFL from
restricting the plaintiffs as a result of Plan B.8 7 Here, Judge Doty
ruled that (1) the players demonstrated a probability of success on
the merits, with or without the application of collateral estoppel;
(2) factors also favored players despite contention that requested
relief would harm competitive balance between teams; and (3)
relief was not precluded by the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Judge
83. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 872.
84. Id. at 872.
85. McNeil v. National Football League, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn.).
86. Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992).
87. Id. at 228.
88. Id. at 226.
Published by Institutional Repository, 1996
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Doty further ruled that the NFL and the clubs were temporarily
enjoined, for a period of five days, from enforcing the Right of First
Refusal/Compensation rules of "Plan B" or from enjoining against
plaintiffs Keith Jackson, Webster Slaughter, D.J. Dozier, and
Garin Veris (the only four players still restricted in the class as of
the date of the order) from freely negotiating and entering into
contracts with any NFL club for the 1992 season. 89 This created a
limited period of free agency for these four players. Keith Jackson
took advantage of this period to sign a new contract with the
Miami Dolphins on September 28, 1992.90
Taken together, the McNeil decision and the Jackson decision
were very important victories for the National Football League
Players Association. These cases showed a likelihood of success
for other NFL players who were restricted due to the implementation of "Plan B." These cases had a tremendous effect on the decision in the matter involving Reggie White, Maurice Hurst, John
Fourcade, and many other NFL veterans.
C. The Effect of the Reggie White Case
On September 21, 1992, less than two weeks after the decision in the McNeil case and one week after the filing of the Jackson case, four named plaintiffs91 filed an action in United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota seeking injunctive
relief on behalf of a limited class of veteran players whose contracts expired on February 1, 1993, and who had, likewise, been
subjected to antitrust and restraint of trade violations as a result
of "Plan B."92 On October 5, 1993, the complaint was amended9 3
to seek both antitrust injunctive relief and damages stemming
from "Plan B," and added Vann McElroy as a named plaintiff.94 It
was also amended to include "all players who have been, are now,
or will be under contract with an NFL club at any time from
August 31, 1987, until the date of the final judgment, as well as all
college and other players who will be eligible by the date of the
89. Id. at 235.
90. Free Agent Jackson Signs With Dolphins, Hou. CHRON., Sept. 30, 1992, at
Sports 2.
91. The four named plaintiffs were Reggie White, Michael Buck, Hardy
Nickerson, and Dave Duerson.
92. See Opposition to Defendants' Motion for an Order to Show Cause, White v.
National Football League, at 2.
93. Please note that the stipulations entered into on January 8, 1993, state
otherwise as to what was included in the second amended complaint and also state
that Vann McElroy was added at this point.
94. White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1395 (D. Minn. 1993).
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proposed judgment." 95 The second amended complaint also
alleged that the NFL illegally fixed players' medical insurance
benefits and tortiously interfered with players' prospective
contracts.9 6
All motions concerning preliminary injunctive relief were still
pending when all parties, with the assistance of the court, reached
tentative agreement to settle the action on January 6, 1993. 97 The
district court further assisted in the settlement process by conditionally certifying a non-opt-out class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1).9" In addition, there were related lawsuits filed which
were consolidated or enjoined. 99 After the preliminary settlement
was reached, seventy-three objections, out of a total class of over
5,000, were filed to the proposed settlement by the April 2, 1992,
deadline. 10 0 10 1 However, these objections were subsequently over10 2
ruled and the settlement approved.
The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement ("Settlement"),
entered into by the District Court and affirmed by the Eighth Cir95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. White, 41 F.3d at 406.
99. Those cases are: (a) Hurst v. NFL, No. 92-3263 (E.D. La.); (b) Dusbabek v.
NFL, No. 4-93-126 (D. Minn.); (c) Lee v. NFL, No. 4-93-125 (D. Minn.); (d) McMillan v.
NFL, No. 4-93-99 (D. Minn); (e) Wright v. NFL, No. 4-93-124 (D. Minn.); (f) Jones v.
NFL, No. 92-2512 (C.D. Cal.); (g) Sanders v. NFL, No. 92-4365 (C.D. Cal.); (h)
Matthews v. NFL, No. 92-4370 (C.D. Cal.); i) Hunter v. NFL, No. 92-4373 (C.D. Cal.);
Cj) O"Neal v. NFL, No. 92-4368 (C.D. Cal); (k) Allen v. NFL, 92-7536 (C.D. Cal); (1)
Norton v. NFL, No. 93-0029 (C.D. Cal.); (m) Hurst & Fourcade v. NFL, No. 93-0766
(E.D. La.); (n) Harper v. NFL, No. 4-93-314 (D. Minn.); (o) Risen v. NFL, No. 4-93-182
(D. Minn.); (p) Duncan v. NFL, No. 93-1481 (C.D. Cal); and (q) Evans v. NFL, Civ. No.
92-878 (D. Ariz).
100. The following active or former NFL players had filed objections by April 2,
1992: Wilbur Marshall, Paul Gruber, Brian Washington, Carl Lee, Mark Dusbabek,
Audray McMillian, Felix Wright, Cody Risien, Mark Harper, Sammy Martin, Mike
Farr, Pepper Johnson, Don Beebe, Gregory Scales, Gregory J. Baty, Barry Sanders,
Luis Sharpe, Steve Atwater, Horatio Bennie Blades, James Hasty, Byron Evans,
Michael C. Johnson, Reggie Langhorne, Maurice Hurst, John Fourcade, Sean Jones,
Eric Allen, Leslie O'Neal, Eric Sanders, Ken Norton, Jr., Curtis Duncan, Patrick
Hunter, William C. Matthews, Cris Dishman, Lomas Brown, Neil Smith, Van
Waiters, Broderick Thompson, Terry Orr, Shane Collins, Ron Middleton, Mark
Schlereth, Kelly Goodburn, David Gulledge, Ed Simmons, Matt Elliott, Joe Jacoby,
Sidney Johnson, Kurt Gouveia, Ravin Caldwell, Mark Rypien, James Jenkins,
Johnny Thomas, Eric Williams, Don Warren, John Elliott, Duane Bickett and Steve
Young.
101. Since April 2, 1993, additional objections were filed on behalf of Brian
Blades, Roland James, Pat Carter, Kenneth F. Ruettgers, Jerry Ball, Jeff Bostic, Todd
Bowles, Ray Brown, Jason Buck, Earnest A. Byner, Desmond Howard, Anthony
Johnson, Brian Mitchell, Ricky Sanders and Paul Siever.
102. White, 822 F. Supp at 1437.
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cult on December 6, 1994, contained a laundry list of provisions
pertaining to structural relief, monetary relief, and other provisions relating to settling 0related
litigation. Each of these is sum3

marized in detail below:1

1. Structural Relief
First, the Settlement provided that, except for the few
"franchise" or "transition" players, to whom special rules apply, all
players with at least five years of NFL experience whose contracts
expired were unrestricted free agents from contract expiration (on
or about March 1) through approximately July 15 of each year. If
the salary cap was put into place, the free agency period would
drop from five to four years. Also, players with three or four years
of NFL experience may be subject to the right of first refusal provisions, but only after a new team tendered a contract offer.
Finally, players with less than three years of NFL experience
were subject to their former teams' exclusive negotiating rights,
providing that they were offered salaries of $100,000 for first year
players, $125,000 for more than one year of NFL experience, and
$150,000 for players with two years experience. These minimum
figures were to be adjusted upward based
on formula concerning
10 4
total league revenues and player costs.

Second, a team could designate one "franchise" player in any
year by tendering a one year contract that was either a twenty
percent increase over his previous year's salary or the average of
the five highest paid players in the NFL at that position, whichever was greater. By designating a player a "franchise" player, a
team obtained exclusive negotiating rights with that player. In
addition, a team could designate two "transition" players for the
first year of the Settlement and one for the second year and the
final year of the Settlement by tendering an offer of a one year
contract at a salary amounting to the greater of the average of the
ten highest paid salaries at that position or a twenty percent
increase over the previous year's salary, whichever was greater.
Also, a team retained a right of first refusal with respect to "transition" players.

10 5

Third, in years where no salary cap is in place, the four teams
in the previous conference championship games were not permitted to sign unrestricted free agents from other teams. The next
103. Id. at 1412-16.
104. Id. at 1412-13.
105. Id. at 1413.
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four runner-up teams in the playoffs could sign one unrestricted
free agent from another team at a salary of $1.5 million or more
per year, and an unlimited number of unrestricted free agents at
less than $1 million per year. These figures were subject to
increase based on league revenues and player costs in relation to
league revenues each year. 106
Fourth, with respect to the college draft, the Settlement provided that the NFL college player draft would consist of eight
rounds the first year of implementation and seven rounds thereafter, substantially fewer than the prior twelve round draft. In
addition, as many as twenty-eight "compensatory" picks per year
could be added for teams losing certain free agents. Also, teams
obtained exclusive negotiating rights with their rookie draftees
through a tender at the minimum active-list salary. Any draft eligible player not chosen in the draft was free to negotiate with any
team. 107
Fifth, a salary cap would be implemented if the league-wide
total of player costs rose to sixty-seven percent of Defined Gross
Revenues (DGR). Once triggered, the salary cap would be subject
to upward adjustments based on the DGR, but the cap itself could
not go down from one year to the next. The Settlement also contained minimum league and team guarantees with respect to the
cap. Finally, the Settlement provided that there would be no cap
in 1999, the last year of the Settlement agreement.1 0 8
Sixth, the Settlement contained various anti-collusion provisions prohibiting the NFL and NFL members from making secret
agreements concerning negotiating with players, submitting offers
to restricted free agents, exercising the right of first refusal, offering a contract, or altering the individual terms of a contract. The
Settlement contained provisions for an expedited and comprehen09
sive mechanism to deter and punish any collusion violations.
2.

Monetary Relief

The Settlement also provided monetary relief to the plaintiff
class. Specifically, the NFL and NFL members were ordered to
pay $115 million for distribution to class members plus an addi106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1414.
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tional $80 million paid to the NFLPA and the players in settlement of this and other related litigation. 110
First, the $115 million settlement was allocated according to
a point system. Players who entered new contracts after being
protected under "Plan B" in 1990, 1991, or 1992 received one point
for each year in which they were restricted while playing under
such a contract. Players who renegotiated and/or extended contracts prior to being protected under "Plan B" in 1990, 1991, or
1992 received 1/2 point for each year in which they continue to be
restricted under such a contract. Players who entered new contracts being protected under "Plan B" in 1989 received 1/2 point
for each year in which they continue to be restricted while playing
under such a contract. Finally, players who renegotiated and/or
extended contracts prior to being protected under "Plan B" in 1989
received 1/4 point for each year they continue to be restricted
while playing under such a contract."1 As it turned out, each
point was assigned the value of $71,000.112
Second, the named plaintiffs in White did not receive any
points while protected in 1990, 1991, and 1992, but received the
following amounts before trebling using the Glassman
methodology:" 3
1.
2.
3.
4.

Michael Buck
Vann McElroy
Hardy Nickerson
Reggie White

$134,805
470,194
494,836
0

In addition, Reggie White received 1 1/2 points because he
entered into a three year contract extension in 1990, and Hardy
Nickerson received 1 point because he entered a two year contract
extension in 1990 before being protected in that year."14 Third,
the named plaintiffs in the Lewis" 5 case (consolidated with
White) did not receive any points for contracts entered into in
1989, but instead received the following amounts for their damage
claims before trebling:" 6
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1414-15.

112. Interview with J. Douglas Sunseri, agent for Maurice Hurst (Feb. 1, 1995).
113. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1415. The methodology for estimating damages was
developed by Michael Glassman, the plaintiffs expert economist.
114. Id.
115. Lewis v. National Football League, 813 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992). The
Lewis case is a class action that claimed damages under the antitrust laws arising out
of 'Plan B" for the 1989 season.
116. Id.
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1. Albert Lewis
2. Wayne Radlof

$711,600
$214,115

Fourth, individual plaintiffs in the related player lawsuits
that were being settled concurrently with the class action were not
to receive any points for claims in those cases that were coextensive with any claims that they may have had in the White class
117
action.
Fifth, class members with claims for deprivation of preseason
pay received 1/10 of a preseason pay point for every one hundred
dollars, or fraction thereof, of their claims. The total number of
points was divided equally into $5 million as settlement for
18
preseason pay loss.'
Finally, Dave Duerson did not receive any preseason pay
points but instead received the sum of $98,302, before trebling, for
what would have been received using the Glassman
methodology. 1 19
3.

Settlement of Related Litigation

Other ancillary matters were incorporated into the White settlement. For instance, the back pay case, NFLPA v. NFL Management Council, 120 fied shortly before the 1987 strike asking for
back pay for the weeks' salary lost as a result of the lockout, was
settled for approximately $30 million. Also, the licensing litigation, NFLPA v. NFL Properties, Inc., 121 asserting various tortious
interference and antitrust violations in existing NFLPA licensing
authorizations, was settled for approximately $10 million in cash
and agreements to back-license certain agreements to the NFLPA

and manufacturers

.122

Also, any preexisting individual lawsuits funded by the
NFLPA, such as McNeil, would not receive any points for portions
already settled. The total consideration to be paid by the NFL
defendants to the preexisting cases was approximately
$19,028,628.123
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. NFL Players Share in Record Settlement; Labor Relations: $30-Million
Judgment Arising from 1987 Strike Will be Divided Among 1,300, L.A. TIMES,
September 13, 1994, at C5.

121. NFLPA v. NFL Properties, Inc., No.90-CV-4244 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
122. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1415-16.
123. Id. at 1416.
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Finally, no legal costs are to be paid out of the settlement
fund. However, the NFL defendants reimbursed the NFLPA
$18,847,520 for attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements in relation to the White class action and other lawsuits concurrently

settled. 124
On Monday, June 12, 1995, the Supreme Court refused to
sought to
hear the claims of 18 present and ex NFL players who
12 5
nullify the $195 million settlement reached in White.
As it turned out, the decision in the White case was important
for many reasons. First, it purportedly solved an extremely complicated class action involving complex legal issues and multijurisdictional demands in as efficient a manner as possible. Second, it addressed and tried to cure all of the ills created by the
implementation of "Plan B," so that no other litigation would
result after the settlement. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it served as the catalyst with which a collective bargaining
agreement was reached between the NFL and the players.
However, the settlement was not without problems. While
the method for solving the complaints was sound, the way the settlement was reached and the effects of the settlement created a
brand new set of problems. Many questions were raised as a
result of the settlement. For instance, how come the party litigants in White had their damages trebled, while the rest of the
aggrieved were left to whatever was implemented according to the
Glassman Methodology? Also, as there was a relatively small
number of players who filed grievances, why did the court deny all
of these players party litigant status? In addition, what effect did
the NFLPA and NFL owners have in the settlement? Finally, was
Minnesota the proper venue for the litigation to take place, or was
there some other place that was more proper? These were just
some of the concerns of the White settlement.
The White settlement is generally perceived as a victory for
the players against the NFL ownership. But was it really a victory for the players, or was it a victory for a few players, most
notably Reggie White?

124. Id.
125. NFL Players Lose Appeal on Settlement, DEr. NEws, June 13, 1995, at 2F.
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III. THE REGGIE WmITE CASE FROM MAURICE HURST AND JOHN
FOURCADE'S PERSPECTIVE.

A.

Background

To fully understand the impact of the White decision on the
potential party litigants, and especially Maurice Hurst and John
Fourcade, a better understanding of the procedural history of
White and Hurst is needed.
On September 21, 1992, two weeks after the McNeil decision,
Reggie White, Dave Duerson, Michael Buck, and Hardy Nickerson
filed suit in the District Court of Minnesota as a class action. This
suit, in its original form, sought injunctive relief only on behalf of
veteran players whose contracts expired on February 1, 1993, and
who had, likewise, been subjected to antitrust and restraint of
trade violations as a result of being placed on "Plan B."' 26 The
claims that were filed in this original suit mirrored those that
were present in the McNeil and had been found to be a violation of
127
antitrust laws.

On October 1, 1992, Maurice Hurst and John Fourcade fied a
class action suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana.128 The
Hurst suit addressed antitrust and restraint of trade violations by
virtue of a scheme where players in the class were placed on "Plan
B" for the years 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992.129 It sought both
injunctive relief and damage relief on behalf of the class. 130
On October 5, 1992, the White suit was amended to add Vann
McElroy as a plaintiff and asserted, for the first time, a damage
claim on behalf of veteran free agents for 1990-92 seasons.13 ' The
White suit now mimicked the Hurst suit in many respects, but
still did not encompass a claim for the 1989 year. Also, the White
suit still was not amended to allege damages for the 1993 season.
On January 8, 1993, a stipulation was entered into in the White
matter where the parties, for the first time, described the class as
a damaged class consisting of all professional players under contract to an NFL club at any time from August 31, 1987 to the date
32
of the final approval of the settlement of this action.
126. See stipulation of January 8, 1993.
127. Id.
128. See Opposition to Defendant's Motion For An Order Show Cause at 2.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 3.
Id.
See stipulation of January 8, 1993.
Id.
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This stipulation was entered into without the knowledge of
the presiding judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana, nor were
pleadings asserting "lis pendens" filed in the Eastern District of
Louisiana.1 33 Objections to the stipulation were to be filed in the
District Court in Minnesota by April 2, 1993.'13
Next, on March 5, 1993, Maurice Hurst and John Fourcade
filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging antitrust and restraint of trade litigation due to the present conduct
and actions taken by the NFL in implementing, without proper
authority, a so-called "free agency" system distinct from "Plan
B." 13 5 This litigation involved separate and distinct issues than
those encompassed in the White litigation. The thrust of the argument in this cause of action was that Maurice Hurst was now
labeled a "restricted" free agent at the expiration of his contract on
February 1, 1992, (due to the fact that he had only four years in
the league at that time and due to the unapproved agreement by
the NFL and White counsel), while, technically, Maurice Hurst
should have been treated as an unrestricted free agent since no
collective bargaining agreement was in effect. 136 The Hurst plaintiffs also fied timely objections to the stipulation in the District
3
Court in Minnesota.1

7

On April 30, 1993, the District Court in Minnesota held that
the class action certification was appropriate, the proposed settlement offer was reasonable and adequate, and objections to the settlement did not warrant disapproval.'

3

In addition, under the

39 ,

All-Writs Act' all related suits, including both suits filed by the
Hurst plaintiffs, were enjoined.'4 0 On August 20, 1993, the Application and Order for Judgment was approved.' 4 ' As a result of
the settlement, Maurice Hurst was awarded two points according
the Glassman methodology and received $142,000, while John
Fourcade was awarded one point and received $71,000.142 These
43
damage awards were not trebled.'
133. Id.

134. Id.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See Complaint filed March 5, 1993.
Id.
See Opposition Motion.
White, 822 F. Supp. at 1395,1432.
28 U.S.C. §1651 (1988).
White, 822 F. Supp. at 1434.

141. Id.
142. Interview with J. Douglas Sunseri, attorney for Maurice Hurst (Feb. 1,
1995).
143. Id.
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On June 12, 1995, the Supreme Court refused to hear the
claims of the Hurst suits and ended all litigation resulting from
the NFL's antitrust violations. It also ended the litigation concerning the alleged violations as a result of the White settlement.
B. Maurice Hurst and John Fourcade'sArguments to the
White Settlement.
Maurice Hurst and John Fourcade had many problems with
the way the White settlement was handled. Specifically, the
Hurst plaintiffs objected to White on four grounds. First, an
injunction should have been issued in the White matter, as the
Hurst suit was the first suit filed asserting damages to the class as
the result of antitrust and restraint of trade violations arising out
of the "Plan B" scheme for the years 1989-92. Second, if no injunction were issued, due process required that Hurst be allowed to
opt-out of the White class settlement. Third, if no injunction was
issued, the Hurst litigation should have been consolidated with
the White litigation, allowing the Hurst plaintiffs to have the status of party litigants to participate fully in any action taken by the
court. Finally, there was no authority to enjoin the March 5, 1993,
lawsuit, as this matter contained none of the allegations present
in the White litigation. Each of these arguments will be dealt
with below in more detail:
First, an injunction should have been issued in the Minnesota
litigation (White), not the Louisiana litigation (Hurst), since the
Hurst action was the first suit fied asserting damages to the class
as a result of antitrust and restraint of trade violations arising out
of the "Plan B" scheme for the years 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992.
Judge Doty specifically rejected the contention that the Hurst
class action was filed before the White class action and also ruled
that subsequent amendments did not initiate new lawsuits, noting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).'4 However, this ruling was in error,
because the amendments allowed under 15(c) did not include the
type of changes the White class made, thus, these amendments
made the White suit second in line to Hurst.
When two actions involving the same parties and the same
issues are pending before two federal courts, it has been held that
the court in which the second proceeding is initiated will normally, in the absence of countervailing factors, stay the proceeding pending the outcome of the prior similar suit between the
144. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1434, n.77.
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same parties in the other federal court. 4 5 This is done in order to
prevent possible conflict between the two courts, to prevent unnecessary duplication of litigation, and to prevent annoyance and
146
harassment of the defendant.
In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2), which is vital to Judge
Doty's reasoning, sets out when an amendment of a pleading will
relate back to the date of the original pleading. It states an
amendment will relate back to the date of the original pleading
when "the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleadings."14 7
Under the foregoing authorities, an injunction should have
been issued in the White matter since the suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana, filed October 1, 1992, was the first suit asserting damages to a class of professional football players as a
consequence of restraint of trade violations arising out of the
"Plan B" scheme over the years 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992. The
White suit, at that time, sought only injunctive relief on behalf of
"Plan B" players for the year 1993. Thus the suits, as originally
filed, involved different class members and different legal issues.
When White subsequently amended his suit to include an injunction and damages on behalf of the class for the years 1990-92, that
suit became second in line in asserting those claims, and as such
should have been consolidated into the Hurst suit in Louisiana.
As such, as held in Culbertson and reiterated in Nelson v.
Grooms1 4 8 , a stay should have been issued in the White matter
pending the outcome of the Hurst action. Rule 15(c) was inapplicable in this case, since the amendments to the original pleading
in White did not cause it to relate back, as Judge Doty concluded.
Second, in the alternative, the Hurst plaintiffs contended that
minimal due process required that they be allowed to opt-out of
the White class settlement. Thus, the Hurst plaintiffs argued that
the settlement agreement in White should not be considered res
judicata when they were not allowed to opt out.
There are many differences between the classic class action
suit and a normal civil suit. Civil suits usually involve plaintiffs
from the same state, while class actions involve plaintiffs from
many different forum states. In addition, due process concerns
145.
146.
147.
148.

Culbertson v. Mid-West Uranium Co., 132 F. Supp. 678 (D. Utah 1955).
Id. at 681.
FED. R. Crv. P. 15(cX2).
307 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1962).
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escalate in class action suits due to the fact that not all of the
potential plaintiffs are allowed to participate in the litigation or
settlements. Thus, special rules have been developed in order to
try to protect the rights of all potential class action plaintiffs,
whether party litigants or otherwise. Minimal due process guarantees require that an absent class member with a claim for monetary damages must be afforded the opportunity to opt out or
otherwise remove himself from the class. 149 The Hurst plaintiffs
were denied minimal due process when they were precluded from
opting out of the White class and settlement, or when they were
not conferred party litigant status. The facts in Ticor are remarkably similar to the situation in Hurst and White. In Ticor, twelve
separate class action lawsuits were brought by title insurance
holders against Ticor, alleging price fixing for title search and
examination services. 150 These suits were filed in five federal district courts in four states. 151 The suits sought monetary and
injunctive relief.152 Several cases were consolidated as Multi-District Litigation (MDL), and the District Court certified a
mandatory class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and (b)(2). 15 '
Thereafter, a global settlement was reached between the parties
and was approved by the District Court.'"
After the District Court granted preliminary approval of the
settlement in the MDL class action, the Arizona Attorney General
and an individual plaintiff, who represented a class of plaintiffs in
two other states, fied separate actions against the same defendants. Like the defendants in White, defendants in the MDL litigation moved to enjoin those plaintiffs from prosecuting
their
56
cases.15 5 The District Court granted the injunction.

149. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,811, (1985), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1223 (1988); Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance, 982 F.2d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. granted in part, 114 S.Ct. 56 (1993), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
114 S.Ct. 1359 (1994).
150. Ticor, 982 F.2d at 387-88.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 388-89.
154. Id. at 388.
155. Id.
156. In addition to the post-settlement case brought by the Arizona Attorney
General, Arizona and Wisconsin title holders also brought a separate antitrust action
against the Ticor defendants. Id. at 389-90. Again, defendants moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the new plaintiffs were parties to and bound by the Ticor
class settlement. Therefore, defendants argued, res judicata barred the new claims.
Id- at 390. As discussed in the text above, the Ninth Circuit rejected these
arguments.
Published by Institutional Repository, 1996
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The Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction, and it held it would
violate minimal due process guarantees if the absent class member's damages claims in the MDL litigation were held barred,
because that absent class member was never given the opportunity to opt-out or otherwise remove himself from the class.1 5 7 The
15
Court of Appeals held:

(M)inimal due process requires that "an absent plaintiff be
provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the
class by executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for
exclusion' form to the court, if monetary claims are involved.

Because Brown, (the absent class member) had no opportunity to opt out of the MDL 633 litigation, we hold there
would be a violation of minimal due process if Brown's damage claim were held barred by res judicata. Brown will be
bound by injunctive relief provided by the settlement in
MDL 633, and foreclosed from seeking other or further
injunctive relief in this case, but res judicata will not bar
Brown's claims for monetary damages against Ticor.
The Supreme Court's directive in Shutts (relied upon by the
Ninth Circuit in Ticor) could not be more plain:
If the forum State wishes to bind an absent plaintiff concerning a claim for money damages or similar relief at law, it
must provide minimal due process protection. The plaintiff
must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel. ... Additionally, we hold that due process requires at a
minimum that an absentplaintiffbe provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and
returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to the

court.'59 (emphasis added).
This is precisely the right the Hurst plaintiffs sought to preserve, since they were not conferred party litigant status. It is
precisely those rights that the defendants undercut when they
were allowed to enjoin both of the Hurst class actions. Thus, the
Hurst plaintiffs should not be bound by the judgments and determinations in the White settlement. They should have had the
right to pursue their own individual claims and remedies. This
was their right under the Constitution since they were not allowed
to opt-out under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) and since there
157. Ticor, 982 F.2d at 392, (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 811 (1985)).
158. Ticor, 982 F.2d at 392.
159. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
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was no conclusive determination at the date of filing that the
Hurst class fit within these Federal Rules. 160 The Hurst case was
procedurally distinct from Ticor, as the Hurst plaintiffs have not
given up their right to litigate Judge Doty's class determination as
the Ticor 1respondents did when they did not bring this issue up on
appeal.

16

Third, since Judge Doty did not allow the Hurst plaintiffs to
opt out of the White settlement, due process rights granted under
the Constitution mandated that they be treated as party litigants
in the Minnesota litigation.
In the Notice of Class Action Settlement filed in White, Section III C stated in pertinent part:
The class representative in this action will receive payment
of their actual alleged damages in recognition of their efforts
on behalf of the class initiating this action and the risk to
their job security in doing so. 16 2 (emphasis added).

The Hurst plaintiffs did not receive compensation, as dictated in
Section III C, for their actual alleged damages. Instead, they were
lumped in with all other NFL players who in no way exercised
their rights through legal proceedings and made to accept what
the party litigants agreed to on their behalf, even though the
Hurst plaintiffs have furthered the cause in the same manner as
stated above, as the White plaintiffs. Thus, the proper remedy
would have been to either allow the Hurst plaintiffs to opt-out of
the White settlement, or to grant party litigant status to the
Hurst plaintiffs so they could receive a proper award based on
their contributions to the class members. The Hurst plaintiffs
have been denied their right to proceed as a party litigant in both
Minnesota and Louisiana. They have also been relegated to the
rights of all other NFL players who failed to exercise their rights.
A good example of what was lost by not being named party litigants was the fact that party litigants received treble damages for
their claims, while class members, which included Maurice Hurst
and John Fourcade, did not.
Finally, the Hurst plaintiffs contend that there was no
authority with which to enjoin their March 5, 1993 lawsuit, as this
contained an entirely separate cause of action than what was settled in White.
160. Ticor, 114 S.Ct. at 1361.
161. Id.
162. See Notice to Class Action Settlement.
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On March 5, 1993, the Hurst plaintiffs asserted new antitrust
and restraint of trade violations based on the NFL and its members implementation of the White settlement and a so-called "free
agency" system.16 3 Under this new system, Maurice Hurst, whose
contract expired on February 1, 1993, was considered a
"restricted" free agent despite the fact that no collective bargaining agreement was in place and due to the fact that the White
settlement had not been agreed to at the time by the NFL and the
White counsel as of the filing of the lawsuit.1 6 4 Any action precluding Maurice Hurst from marketing his services without
restriction should have been considered a restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust laws.' 65 Minnesota District Court Judge
David S. Doty cited two independent bases for enjoining the other
suits, those being personal jurisdiction over the objectors and the
All-Writs Act.166 The Eighth Circuit noted "while the All-Writs
Act is not an independent grant ofjurisdiction, the ability to facilitate the present settlement by enjoining related suits of absent
67
class members is ancillary to jurisdiction over the class itself."
The Eighth Circuit also noted that "if the district court were to
approve the settlement without enjoining at least related claims,
the agreement would be inadequate to end litigation relating to
affirmed the district court's
the labor dispute," and, therefore,
68
enjoinder of both Hurst suits.'

First, there was no personal jurisdiction with which to enjoin
the March 5, 1993, lawsuit. For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction, the party must have "minimum contacts" with the forum
such that the maintenance of the suit does not violate "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."

69

The Eighth Circuit

held that the objectors to the White settlement, including the
Hurst plaintiffs, had submitted themselves to the personal jurisdiction, citing In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Services
Antitrust Litigation, 71 when they appeared through counsel to
163. Hurst & Fourcade v. National Football League, No. 93-0766 (E.D. La. filed
March 5, 1993).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. White, 41 F.3d at 409, (citing 28 U.S.C. §1651 (1988)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), citing
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
170. White, 41 F.3d at 407-08, citing In re Real Estate Title and Settlement
Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 770-71 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert den., 493 U.S. 821
(1989).
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contest the merits of the settlement, offering testimony, crossexamining witnesses, and filing numerous memoranda of law
regarding the settlement.' 7 1 However, in the March 5, 1993, lawsuit, the Hurst plaintiffs were not contesting the merits of the
White settlement. They could not contest the merits at this time,
as no final settlement had been reached at the time of the filing of
the suit. Therefore, the District Court misapplied the holding in
In re Real Estate to conclude that they had personal jurisdiction
with which to enjoin the suit. In addition, the March 5, 1993, lawsuit alleged antitrust and restraint of trade violations outside of
the scope of the White settlement, and as such an independent
bases must be established for personal jurisdiction. Since there
were no "minimum contacts," the District Court erred in finding
personal jurisdiction and the Eighth Circuit erred in affirming
their ruling.
Second, the application of the All-Writs rule was incorrect.
The claims in the March 5, 1993, lawsuit are not related in any
way to the claims settled in White. The settlement in White purported to encompass all claims under "Plan B." The March 5 lawsuit does not arise out of "Plan B," but instead arises out of the
settlement of the White lawsuit. As such, the Eighth Circuit's
reliance on the All-Writs Act was in error. Therefore, it was
improper for the district court in White to exercise its jurisdiction
by enjoining the March 5, 1993, action, which in no way were
related to the White settlement.
Thus, because the District Court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Hurst plaintiffs and because the All-Writs Act did
not apply to the March 5 lawsuit, it was improper for the District
Court to enjoin the March 5, 1993 lawsuit. As such, the Hurst
plaintiffs should have been allowed to proceed with their lawsuit
in the Eastern District of Louisiana for antitrust and restraint of
trade violations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The White decision, on its face, was an important decision in
settling much of the labor strife that was present in the National
Football League in the early 1990's. It purported to end all litigation as a result of the owner's unilateral implementation of "Plan
B" in 1989 in a fair and equitable manner to all parties involved.
It also was the cornerstone to the subsequent collective bargaining
171. White, 41 F.3d at 408.
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agreement between the NFL owners and the NFLPA in 1993. As
this paper indicates, however, the White decision stands for much
more than that.
Maurice Hurst and John Fourcade are just two of the many
aggrieved NFL players who have shown that the White settlement
was not as fair or just as many parties, including the NFL Owners
and NFLPA, would lead you to believe. In fact, the White settlement should never have been approved by Judge Doty in Minnesota. The proper forum for hearing the claims concerning the
alleged antitrust violations and restraint of trade claims as a
result of "Plan B" was the Eastern District of Louisiana.
It is interesting to note how this settlement and the subsequent collective bargaining agreement have affected the careers of
Maurice Hurst and John Fourcade. Maurice Hurst was made a
restricted free agent as a result of the White settlement and subsequent collective bargaining agreement. Thus, in order to
become an unrestricted free agent in 1994, Maurice Hurst signed
a one-year agreement with the New England Patriots in 1993 for
$470,000, the minimum offer New England was allowed to give. 172
After playing out the 1994 season, New England designated Maurice Hurst a "Transition" player.173 The effect of being designated
a "Transition" player was that Maurice Hurst was once again subject to the First Refusal/Compensation system. When negotiations broke down, Maurice Hurst notified the New England
Patriots that he would accept, as per the new collective bargaining
agreement, the mandatory one year offer of 1.9 million dollars for
cornerbacks designated as "Transition" players. 7 4 In response,
Bill Parcells, head coach of New England, notified Mr. Hurst that
he would release him approximately one week before the season
started, and lose the non-guaranteed contract.' 7 5 Realizing that
the result of this would be that he would be out of the League or
would have to re-sign for substantially less money, Maurice Hurst
accepted a three-year deal for 5.1 million dollars, with an
$800,000 signing bonus.17 6 Ironically, this was the offer that
Maurice Hurst had rejected the previous week.17 7 Subsequently,
in the second year of the three year contract, Maurice Hurst suf172.
1995).
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Interview with J. Douglas Sunseri, attorney for Maurice Hurst (Feb. 1,
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol13/iss2/2

28

Hays: Labor Strife in the National Football League, Why the Reggie Whit
1995-1996]

LABOR STRIFE IN THE NFL

fered a disk injury to his back and neck region. As a result of this
injury, in November of 1995, the New England Patriots terminated his contract. Hurst then filed an injury grievance to recover
lost compensation for the rest of the 1995 season, a suit that was
later settled.' 78 After surgery, Maurice Hurst attempted a comeback for the 1996 season with the St. Louis Rams, signing a $1.1
million, 1 year contract with a $275,000 signing bonus. 179 However, this comeback attempt proved unsuccessful, as Maurice
Hurst was cut in the final preseason cuts. Currently, Maurice
Hurst is retired from the National Football League.
John Fourcade, on the other hand, has not been so fortunate.
He did not receive a new contract offer from the New Orleans
Saints after his contract expired in 1990.180 Today, he is out of
football. Perhaps John Fourcade suffered a similar fate as Kermit
Alexander, Sam McCullum and John Mackey had before him,
allegedly losing their jobs in retaliation for bringing lawsuits. 81
Finally, it is interesting to note how the White settlement had
affected the business of professional football. The hard cap that
was instituted as a result of the settlement has had a great impact
on how individual players have been treated. Many veteran players have been released or asked to take a substantial pay cuts in
order to remain in the league. The key factor in contract negotiations now centers around the signing bonus, rather than the average salary or number of years within the contract, as this is the
only money that is truly guaranteed. The hard cap itself is forever
manipulated by teams varying incentives around those that are
"likely to be achieved," which count against the cap, and incentives that are not, which do not count.
The bottom line seems to be that, once again, the NFL Players
Association, led by Gene Upshaw, have sabotaged the very players
they were elected to represent in pushing for this deal. One can
only imagine the labor strife that will occur when this collective
bargaining agreement ends in 1999. Hopefully, for the sake of the
game and the fans, things can be worked out peacefully and without a work stoppage. Don't hold your breath.
178. Id. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, an injured

player, subsequently cut, is entitled to compensation for the season in which he is
injured, but is not entitled to compensation beyond that point for any subsequent
season in which the player is under contract. Thus, Maurice Hurst was not entitled to
compensation for the final year of the three year contract.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1423, n45.
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